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Nichol: Waiver under the West Virginia Habeas Corpus Act

WAIVER UNDER THE WEST VIRGINIA
HABEAS CORPUS ACT
GENE R. NICHOL, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

In 1967 the West Virginia Legislature responded to both
suggestion and pressure from the federal judiciary by enacting the
Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act.' The new statute provided for
habeas corpus jurisdiction in all circuit courts of the state, and,
more importantly, for the first time expressly provided for review
of detentions claimed to be in violation of the United States or
West Virginia Constitutions. 2 Case law since the enactment has
demonstrated that the scope of habeas corpus relief in West Virof its traditionally broad counterginia is moving in the direction
3
part in the federal system.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has manifested
its determination to employ both the expanded jurisdiction over
constitutional issues4 and the stream-lined procedures for summary denial of the writ called for in the statute.5 The court has yet
to develop substantial guidelines, however, with regard to the
waiver or procedural default provisions contained in the PostConviction Habeas Corpus Act. The following is a discussion of
existing case law and a suggestion for future interpretation of those
provisions.

The basic grant of habeas review in the statute provides that
a person convicted of a crime and incarcerated who contends that
* Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; B.A.,
1973, Oklahoma State University; J.D., 1976, University of Texas.
' W. VA. CODE § 53-4A-1 to -11 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
2 W. VA. CODE § 53-4A-l(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
See State ex rel. Grob v. Blair, 214 S.E.2d 330 (W. Va. 1975); Dobbs v.

Wallace, 201 S.E.2d 914 (W. Va. 1974). The federal habeas corpus act is set forth
in 28 U.S.C. 44 2241-55 (1976).
See State ex rel. Burgett v. Oakley, 155 W. Va. 276, 184 S.E.2d 318 (1971);
State ex rel. Pingley v. Coiner, 155 W. Va. 591, 186 S.E.2d 220 (1972).
5 West Virginia Code §§ 53-4A-3(a) and 53-4A-4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) provide
for the denial of a writ of habeas corpus without a hearing and without appointing
counsel for the petitioner if the application and supporting materials demonstrate
to the satisfaction of the court that the petitioner is entitled to no relief. See also
Perdue v. Coiner, 194 S.E.2d 657 (W. Va. 1973).
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his conviction was the result of a violation of his constitutional
rights may seek relief on those grounds "if and only if such contention or contentions and the grounds in fact or law relied upon in
support thereof have not been previously and finally adjudicated
or waived in the proceedings which resulted in the conviction and
sentence. . ...,IBy way of explanation, the statute provides that

a constitutional claim has been "previously and finally adjudicated" if at some point in the original trial (or subsequent habeas
petition) there was a decision on the merits of the allegation after
a full and fair hearing.7 Whether or not a contention has been
waived by the failure to pursue properly the claim at trial is specifically addressed in West Virginia Code section 53-4A-1(c) as follows:
[A] contention or contentions and the grounds in fact or
law relied upon in support thereof shall be deemed to have been
waived when the petitioner could have advanced, but intelligently and knowingly failed to advance, such contention or con-

tentions and grounds before trial, at trial, or on direct appeal
• ..unless such contention or contentions and grounds are such
that, under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of this State, they cannot be waived under the circumstances giving rise to the alleged waiver."
Despite the broad wording of the act, the burden is clearly placed
upon the petitioner to demonstrate that waiver did not occur. If a
constitutional claim could have been presented at trial or on direct
appeal and was in fact not presented, a rebuttable presumption
arises that the petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived the
claim.'
The interpretation of these statutory guidelines is determinative of the parameters of habeas corpus review in the courts of the
state. If a petitioner in a habeas proceeding claims that his detention is in derogation of certain constitutional rights, he typically
would have presented the identical claim to the trial court in which
he was convicted. For example, if a petitioner claimed that a confession used by the state at his trial had been coerced, and the
court denied such contention on the merits, then the court in which
habeas relief is sought should determine whether a "full and fair
hearing" on the issue was afforded by the trial court and, if so,
£

W. VA. CODE § 53-4A-l(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
W. VA. CODE § 53-4A-l(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
W. VA. CODE § 53-4A-1(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).

'Id.

f
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whether the decision rendered was clearly erroneous. Accordingly,
the court hearing the habeas petition would review the opportunity
given to present the claim at trial and the findings of fact and
conclusions of law drawn by the trial court regarding the voluntariness of the confession. Federal case law has developed significant
guidelines, which have been codified in 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d),
to aid in the determination of whether a full and fair hearing was
provided in the trial court." West Virginia courts should make use
of these provisions when interpreting the analogous state standard.
When a petitioner seeks to present a constitutional claim
which was not adjudicated at trial, however, a different analysis
is necessary. For example, if a state prisoner claims that evidence
seized in violation of his fourth amendment rights was used in his
trial, yet that evidence was admitted without objection, it may be
that the trial court made no explicit determination regarding the
reasonableness of the search and seizure. In this instance, the state
court, presented with a constitutional claim which is made for the
first time upon application for habeas corpus, faces a different
question. The habeas court must determine whether or not the
contention (that the use of the fruits of the seizure constituted a
deprivation of the applicant's constitutionally protected rights)
was waived under the provisions of the statute" as a result of the
procedural default arising from the failure to present the argument
at trial. The analysis of waiver, therefore, determines which questions, if any, a court may examine upon application for habeas
which were not properly presented to the convicting court. The
standard which determines whether or not a procedural default has
occurred which will properly prevent review of the claim on application for habeas corpus has proven troublesome to both federal
and state courts.
]I
Because of the limited scope of the writ prior to the 1967
statute," development of the doctrine of waiver in the context of
habeas corpus is of relatively recent vintage in West Virginia. Al3
though several cases deal with the issue indirectly, the most thor11See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976).
" W. VA. CODE § 53-4A-l(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978).

See, Note, Habeas Corpus in West Virginia, 69 W. VA. L. REV. 293 (1967).
See, e.g., Dobbs v. Wallace, 201 S.E.2d 914 (W. Va. 1974); State ex rel. Grob
v. Blair, 214 S.E.2d 330 (W. Va. 1975).
"
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ough consideration of the waiver provision set forth in section 534A-1(c) occurred in the 1972 case Ford v. Coiner.4
In Ford, the habeas petitioner had been convicted and sentenced by the court for first degree murder despite the fact that the
jury verdict merely stated that he was "guilty in the within indictment as charged."' 5 In accordance with West Virginia law," the
indictment did not specify the degree of murder. As a result, John
Ford claimed that his constitutional right to trial by jury, and a
specific provision of the West Virginia Code requiring the jury to
is guilty of first or second degree murfind whether the defendant
7
der, were violated.

At trial, however, it appeared that Ford's counsel failed to
object to the form of the verdict despite statements made by the
prosecutor which should have brought the issue to his attention.",
On the basis of waiver, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
denied Ford's application for habeas corpus. In affirming the circuit court, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals turned to
the language of section 53-4A-1(c) which provides for a "rebuttable
presumption that the petitioner intelligently and knowingly"
waived his claim if it was not presented at trial. The majority of
the court held that since Ford's counsel had failed to present an
objection to the form of the verdict, "Ford, 'intelligently and knowingly failed to advance.

.

. on

direct appeal' the deficiency in the

jury verdict, and that he therefore waived this contention.""'
Judge Haden expressed a vigorous and thoughtful dissent."
He characterized the right Ford sought to vindicate as
"fundamental" and constitutionally protected.2 More importantly
for our purposes (if not for Mr. Ford's) the dissent criticized the
majority's concept of "knowing and intelligent" waiver. By indicating that Ford's counsel waived the constitutional claim by failure to object, the majority essentially interpreted the "knowing
14156 W. Va. 362, 196 S.E.2d 91 (1972). The Ford case is discussed extensively
in 76 W. VA. L. REv. 242 (1974).
" Id. at 365, 196 S.E.2d at 93.
" See State v. Lewis, 133 W. Va. 584, 57 S.E.2d 573 (1949).
'7 W. VA. Code § 62-3-15 (1966) provides in part as follows: "If c person indicted for murder be found by the jury guilty thereof, they shall in their verdict
find whether he is guilty of murder of the first or second degree."
" 156 W. Va. at 364, 196 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 367, 196 S.E.2d at 95. (emphasis supplied by the court).
21 Id. (Haden, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 377, 196 S.E.2d at 101. (Haden, J., dissenting).
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and intelligent" standard to include waiver by judgment, in other
words, waiver of a right by failure to present the claim in the
proper procedural fashion. Judge Haden, however, stated that the
statutory provisions, through the use of the term "knowing and
intelligent," adopted the standard set forth in various federal constitutional decisions requiring the voluntary relinquishment of a
known right.22 Accordingly, waiver should occur under the statute
only through knowledgeable overt acts of the accused.? Since Ford
himself could not be presumed to have had any knowledge of the
propriety of varying forms of jury verdicts, the dissent argued that
no waiver was possible. Moreover, the fact that Ford's counsel
advocated "almost every imaginable" point of error on direct appeal, and yet did not mention the jury's verdict, led Judge Haden
not have made a knowlto conclude that even Ford's counsel could
24
edgeable decision to forego the claim.
The different approaches taken by the majority and the dissent in Ford v. Coiner point directly to the disputed scope of the
writ of habeas corpus in West Virginia. Waiver based on principles
of foreclosure by judgment allows for greater finality of trial court
convictions and, correspondingly, limits the areas of inquiry upon
application for habeas corpus. On the other hand, to require that
a procedural default under section 53-4A-1(c) be considered a voluntary relinquishment of a known constitutional right before it will
bar review upon habeas opens the door for vigorous and substantial
review of the state's criminal process by collateral attack.
If the West Virginia statute is interpreted to allow waiver by
judgment, few constitutional defenses could be considered upon
habeas which were not determined adversely to the petitioner at
trial. Basically, the court faced with a habeas issue would be forced
to fall back to the subsequent wording in section 53-4A-1(c) allowing the consideration of those constitutional claims which cannot
be waived under the circumstances. If, however, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals makes it clear that the waiver provision
is to be interpreted as requiring a voluntary relinquishment of a
known right, only intentional decisions by a criminal defendant
not to present a claim to the state court would bar subsequent
review. Of course the decision of counsel, if knowledgeable and
made under such circumstances as to make informing the defen22 See

(1963).
23

24

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391

156 W. Va. at 379, 196 S.E.2d at 102. (Haden, J., dissenting).
Id. at 381, 196 S.E.2d at 103. (Haden, J., dissenting).
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dant impossible (such as decisions regarding trial tactics) would
also constitute voluntary relinquishment of a known right.
Certainly there are situations in which a "knowing" waiver
may occur. If, for example, a decision was made by petitioner's
counsel to allow an arguably coerced statement to be introduced
at trial because of counsel's belief that the confession contained
certain exculpatory aspects, the underlying constitutional claim
would have been "knowingly" waived. Further, if counsel decided
not to object to the admissability of the fruits of an illegal search
and seizure in order to bring the conduct of the police to the attention of the jury, the fourth amendment claim would be similarly
waived. Under situations such as these, in which a decision with
some rational basis is made to forego a constitutional defense, a
voluntary relinquishment of a known right occurs, and subsequent
review of that constitutional claim on habeas would be barred. If
the statute is interpreted to include waiver by judgment, however,
a petitioner would be prevented from asserting potentially valid
constitutional defenses merely because at trial neither he nor his
counsel were aware of the existence of such defenses. The petitioner may indeed have been convicted with the aid of a constitutionally defective identification procedure, or perhaps in violation
of his right not to be subjected to double jeopardy; but because of
his failure to present such a claim at trial, he would be barred from
vindicating his constitutional objection in any court.
Although the course of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals is not totally clear in this regard," it would appear that
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals dealt with waiver in the habeas context in Dobbs v. Wallace, 201 S.E.2d 914 (W. Va. 1974). In Dobbs, it was
held that two indigent parolees were denied their rights to equal protection of the
law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
by the failure to provide counsel at their revocation hearings. In response to the
state's allegation that the parolees had waived their right to counsel, the court held
that because they were not informed of their right to have counsel appointed "their
actions were insufficient to effect a valid waiver of a constitutional right." Id. at
919. This decision might be seen as embracing the voluntary relinquishment stan.
dard described above. However, Dobbs involved a waiver of the right to counsel
alleged to have taken place prior to the revocation hearing. Accordingly, Dobbs
represented a constitutional claim which could not properly "be waived under the
circumstances giving rise to the alleged waiver." See W. VA. CODE § 53-4A-1(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1978). Therefore, the Dobbs decision does not represent an interpretation of the general waiver provisions of the Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act.
The 1975 case of State ex rel. Grob v. Blair, 214 S.E.2d 330, 337 (W. Va. 1975),
held that habeas petitioner "John Grob did not, by word or deed, waive his right"
to confrontation at trial. The Grob opinion was authored by Judge Haden and may
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the majority in Ford adopted waiver by judgment, thus choosing
the narrow road and limiting the scope of habeas corpus review in
the state. For the reasons discussed below, the adoption of the
voluntary relinquishment standard is more consistent with the legislative intent of the Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act and certainly more in line with sound criminal procedure policy for the
state of West Virginia.
A.

Legislative Purpose

Any reading of the waiver provisions which would allow for the
extensive forfeiture of constitutional claims is inconsistent with
both the language and legislative purpose of the Post-Conviction
Habeas Corpus Act. In 1963, the United States Supreme Court
held in Fay v. Noial6 that federal courts had power to hear the
constitutional claims of prisoners convicted in state courts even if
a state court would not hear the claim because of a procedural
default. After Fay, states were forced to deal with the pressure of
extensive intrusion through the use of federal habeas corpus by
state prisoners. State jurists and legal commentators deplored the
invasion into the prerogatives of state criminal justice.2 Further,
indeed be offered as support for the adoption of the voluntary relinquishment
standard in West Virginia habeas actions. The Grob decision, however, dealt with
the right to confrontation which, as the court discussed extensively, had been
traditionally considered non-waivable in West Virginia. Id. at 334-36. It would
appear, then, that Ford v. Coiner remains the most authoritative consideration of
the general waiver provisions of the act.
" 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Fay involved a federal habeas application by a New
York petitioner who was convicted on the basis of a coerced confession. The record
indicated that the sole evidence offered in the trial of the petitioner, Noia, was his
confession. The evidence presented upon habeas clearly established, and the state
of New York stipulated as much, that Noia's confession had been obtained through
the use of "satanic practices". However, because Noia had failed to appeal his
conviction (unlike his co-defendants who had previously been released on the same
grounds), the federal habeas court denied relief on the basis of procedural default.
In a sweeping opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Noia's decision not
to appeal could not be considered a deliberate by-pass of the state court system,
and, therefore, the district court had power to entertain the constitutional question
on habeas. The Court recognized a very limited discretion to refuse habeas relief
as the result of a procedural default which arises only if the decision not to present
the constitutional claim to the convicting court constituted a voluntary relinquishment of a known right. 372 U.S. at 439.
27 See Desmond, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions-Proposalsfor Reform, 9 UTAH L. REv. 18 (1964); Ford v. Coiner, 156 W. Va.
362, 374, 196 S.E.2d 91, 95 (1972) (Haden, J., dissenting).
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federal district judges were unhappily swamped with habeas applications.
As a result, local district courts expressed the need for expansion of the writ of habeas corpus in West Virginia." Moreover, the
United States Supreme Court suggested that state legislatures
modernize habeas corpus relief: "The procedure should be swift
and simple and easily invoked. It should be sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all federal constitutional claims. In light of
Fay v. Noia. . .it should eschew rigid and technical doctrines of
forfeiture, waiver, or default."2
Recognizing these concerns, the West Virginia Legislature
passed the Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act in 1967. The statute was hailed by the federal judiciary as an attempt to fully meet
"the suggestions of Congress and the federal courts that states
enact adequate post-conviction remedies."3 Thus, in order to curb
intrusion by the federal judiciary, it is apparent that the West
Virginia statute was intended to provide for a state writ fully as
comprehensive and broad in scope as federal habeas became after
Fay. This meant that state habeas courts had to open their doors
to all federal constitutional claims, and the act expressly provides
for such review. 3 ' Further, rigid concepts of forfeiture by procedural
default had to be discarded. That is what the legislature sought to
do in section 53-4A-1(c). Accordingly, any ifnterpretation of the
provision which includes waiver by judgment is unacceptable.
It is also clear that the use of the phrase "knowing and intelligent" in the statute indicates that the legislature sought to require
overt acts and a knowledgeable decision by the petitioner before
review on habeas would be barred. In Fay, the Court held that a
procedural default would bar federal habeas review of a constitutional defense only if "a habeas applicant, after consultation with
a competent counsel. . .understandingly and knowingly forewent
the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state
courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can
fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures
"32

As further explanation of the federal standard, the Court held
7,See, e.g., Miller v. Boles, 248 F. Supp. 49,'59 (N.D. W. Va. 1965).
2 Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 346-47 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
31See Zeftwich v. Coiner, 424 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1970).
3' W. VA. CODE § 53-4A-l(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
2 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
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that the traditional Johnson v. Zerbst:
standard of voluntary relinquishment of a known right was controlling, and that a choice
made by counsel, not participated in by petitioner, does not automatically bar habeas relief.L3 Therefore, when the West Virginia
Legislature indicated in section 53-4A-1(c) that a procedural default would bar review on habeas corpus only if it was "knowing
and intelligent," it employed a term of art, borrowed from federal
constitutional law, which requires, in effect, a deliberate by-pass
or a voluntary relinquishment of a known right in order for waiver
to exist.

B.

Federal Retreat

Even apart from the above consideration of legislative intent,
several factors strongly support a liberal waiver standard which
would allow extensive review of alleged constitutional defects in
trial process through state habeas corpus.
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have evidenced a marked curtailment of the scope of federal habeas corpus.
Under the rationale of Fay discussed above, federal courts were
free to entertain constitutional claims not presented to the trial
court unless a deliberate decision was made not to pursue the
claim in state court. Accordingly, federal supervision of state criminal process was significant. In 1977, however, the Burger Court
effectively overruled Fay in Wainwright v. Sykes" and held that a
procedural default in state court bars review on federal habeas
unless the petitioner can meet the two-prong test of "cause and
prejudice.""' Although the Supreme Court has yet to give real content to those terms, Wainwright made it very clear that it will have
304 U.S. 458 (1937).
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
433 U.S. 72 (1977). In Wainwright, the petitioner sought habeas relief on the
ground that he had been intoxicated and, therefore, had not understood the Miranda warnings that had been given him. At his trial he had not challenged the
admissibility of the inculpatory statements he made after being given the warnings.
Based upon the record, it is safe to assume that the statement went unchallenged
because petitioner's counsel was unaware of the propriety of such an objection. Yet,
the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, held that his failure to
comply with a state rule requiring contemporaneous objection to the admission of
his statement barred review upon habeas. The Court specifically rejected Fays
deliberate by-pass rule and held that a procedural default would prohibit subsequent habeas review unless the petitioner could show adequate cause for his failure
to object and demonstrate actual prejudice.
14Id. at 87.
"
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to be a rare case indeed in order for a federal court to intervene on
the basis of a constitutional claim not presented to the convicting
court.
Moreover, the Court held recently in Stone v. Powell37 that not
all constitutional claims are cognizable on federal habeas corpus.
There it was held that fourth amendment claims were to be the
subject of federal habeas relief only if the state failed to provide
an opportunity for a hearing on the issue at trial. Justice Brennan
expressed fear in his dissent in Stone that the Court was laying the
groundwork for drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction
"if not for all grounds of alleged unconstitutional detention, then
at least for claims-for example, of double jeopardy, entrapment,
self-incrimination, Miranda violations, and use of invalid identification procedures-that this Court later decides are not 'guilt re3
lated.",1
These recent decisions signal a decided trend toward a narrowing of the scope of federal habeas. Such a trend would seem to
reflect either a decision by the Burger Court to abdicate constitutional review on federal habeas under the belief that the "Great
Writ" 39 is of limited importance today, or a determination that

state court systems should be free to develop their own criminal
procedures in such a way as to ensure the protection of the constitutional rights of defendants. In either event, the retreat by the
federal judiciary in this area should be followed by a corresponding
expansion of the scope of constitutional review in state courts.
State court systems are no longer burdened by repeated federal
intrusion through habeas. Conversely, however, courts can no
longer rely on federal habeas corpus as an ultimate guarantor of
civil rights. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not
only indicated a general reluctance to accept the relaxation of
constitutional standards authorized by the Burger Court, but also
has recently taken significant steps to protect the rights of criminal
defendants." Similarly, with respect to the scope of constitutional
review allowable on state habeas corpus, the narrowed scope of
428 U.S. 465 (1976).
3 Id. at 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31 For a general discussion of the historical aspects of habeas corpus, see R.
SHARPE, THE LAw OF HABEAS CORPUS 1-20 (1976).
1oSee State v. McAboy, 236 S.E.2d 431 (W. Va. 1977); Cannellas v. McKenzie,
236 S.E.2d 327 (W. Va. 1977); and State v. Boyd, 233 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1975).
See also 80 W. VA. L. REv. 318 (1978).
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federal habeas is a strong reason for an expansive reading of the
West Virginia Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act.
C. The Nature of ProceduralDefault
Any rational consideration of the effect which a procedural
default should have upon subsequent review of constitutional issues must take into account the meaning and import of a typical
default. As discussed above,' there are undoubtedly situations in
which procedural default represents a rational decision not to pursue a constitutional objection before the trial court. Under the
suggested interpretation of section 53-4A-1(c), a petitioner would
be prevented from asserting such constitutional claims on habeas.
But the typical procedural default does not represent a studied choice of tactical alternatives by defendant's counsel. Nor,
indeed, is the typical procedural default a conscious decision of
any kind. Rather, the "ordinary procedural default is borne of the
inadvertence, negligence, inexperience, or incompetence of trial
counsel. ' 12 Generally, the failure of defense counsel to object to the
admissibility of the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, a
coerced confession, the use of uncounselled prior convictions for
sentencing purposes, improper make-up of grand jury, etc., can
only be attributed to the fact that counsel was unaware of the
propriety of such objections. For example, counsel's failure to object to the form of the verdict as discussed above in Ford v. Coiner
could hardly have been tactically motivated since his client had
already been convicted. It is in situations such as these that the
difference between waiver by judgment and waiver only as the
result of a voluntary relinquishment of a known right becomes
crucial. If the West Virginia waiver provisions set forth in section
53-4A-1(c) are interpreted to include waiver by judgment as occurred in Ford v. Coiner, procedural defaults unrelated to tactical
decisions, but based on mistakes by trial counsel, will3 bar consideration of certain constitutional claims in any forum.1
"

See text accompanying notes 14-24 supra.

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 104 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Regardless of the waiver standard applicable for habeas review, a criminal
defendant may, of course, assert inadequate assistance of counsel as a ground for
reversal of his conviction. Although West Virginia traditionally embraced the
"mockery of justice" test in order to determine the effectiveness of counsel, see
State ex rel. Blankenship v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 377, 141 S.E.2d 68 (1965), the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently liberalized the standard in State v.
Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).
s
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Necessarily, the proper weight to be given a procedural default
involves a balancing of two factors. Both the integrity of the state
procedural system and the protection of the constitutional rights
of criminal defendants deserve important consideration. It is suggested that the voluntary relinquishment standard provides proper
protection to final state court convictions by preventing habeas
review after an intentional by-pass of the trial forum. Yet the
standard correctly refuses to bar the presentation of substantial
constitutional objections merely because petitioner's counsel was
unaware of the propriety of the objection at trial. Certainly the
assurance of due process in our trial courts, both for the protection
of individual defendants and as a supervisory tool statewide, is a
goal worthy of some inconvenience. To employ waiver by judgment
and, in effect, insure "an airtight system of forfeitures"4 constitutes an undue deference to local procedure while cutting off review of constitutional defenses in the state forum. As Justice Brennan stated recently:
In short, I believe that the demands of our criminal justice
system warrant visiting the mistakes of a trial attorney on the
head of a habeas corpus applicant only when we are convinced
that the lawyer actually exercised his expertise and judgment
in his client's service, and with his client's knowing and intelligent participation where possible."
In Thomas, the court held that in the determination of a claim that the accused
was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel courts should measure and compare the questioned counsel's performance by whether he exhibited the normal and
customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable
in criminal law. 203 S.E.2d at 461. Although the Thomas case and subsequent
decisions, see Cannellas v. McKenzie, 236 S.E.2d 327 (W. Va. 1977); Carter v.
Bordenkircher, 226 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 1976), have demonstrated that the West
Virginia court is willing to undertake closer review of the actions of defense counsel,
it remains clear that substantial probability of actual injury, and indeed, significantly unreasonable conduct by counsel must be shown in order for a conviction to
be reversed on the basis of inadequate assistance.
As a result, it is very likely that a habeas petitioner could be barred from
presenting a constitutional claim, under the concept of waiver by judgment, merely
because his counsel unknowingly failed to pursue the objection at trial; and yet
counsel's error would not be sufficient to allow review under the more stringent
inadequate assistance standard. Such a situation again leaves the habeas petitioner
without a forum for the presentation of his constitutional claim. Furthermore, it is
preferable to allow open review on habeas application of constitutional issues not
presented to the trial court because such review is removed from the implied "trial
of counsel" inherent in review for inadequate assistance of counsel.
1 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 432 (1963).
4 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 116 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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D. The Necessity of a Broad Right to
Habeas Corpus Review in West Virginia
In West Virginia, a person convicted of a criminal offense is
not entitled to an appeal as a matter of right. Rather, the West
Virginia Constitution and enabling statutes merely create an absolute right to apply for a writ of error to the state supreme court. 6
Accordingly, significant numbers of criminal convictions are simply not subjected to meaningful review. West Virginia's highest
court has held this system to be consistent with the federal due
process clause.4" Such may well be the case; however, the absence
of appeal as of right speaks forcefully for the necessity of broad
review on habeas corpus. If the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals is indeed seeking to strengthen procedural due process
within the state, it would seem that a viable habeas forum is essential.
Nor would the expanded scope of habeas suggested unreasonably burden the circuit courts. The Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act provides for the summary dismissal of an application for
habeas relief, without hearing or appointment of counsel, if the
petition demonstrates to the court's satisfaction that the applicant
is entitled to no relief.4 8 Moreover, the statute creates a rebuttable
presumption that a claim not presented to the trial court was
knowingly waived. 9 Therefore, even with a waiver standard allowing broad review, it would be necessary for petitioner to present a
prima facie case in order to overcome the statutory presumption.
Accordingly, the statute provides ample means for the disposition
of groundless petitions.
CONCLUSION

In light of the above discussion, it is suggested that the waiver
provision set forth in section 53-4A-1(c) be interpreted in accordance with the voluntary relinquishment standard of Fay v. Noia.
Pursuant to such an interpretation, only a knowing decision to
forego a constitutional claim in the convicting court would constitute a sufficient procedural default to bar review of that claim on
habeas. The voluntary relinquishment standard, as opposed to the
' W. VA. CONsT. art. III, § 6; W. VA. CODE § 57-5-1 to -4 (1966).
4 State v. Legg, 151 W. Va. 401, 151 S.E.2d 215 (1966).
' W. VA. CODE § 53-4A-3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978); See Perdue v. Coiner, 194

S.E.2d 657 (W. Va. 1973).
" W. VA. CODE § 53-4A-1(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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concept of waiver by judgment, will necessarily result in a broader
habeas forum for the consideration of alleged constitutional deficiencies in the trial process. Furthermore, increased collateral supervision of state criminal procedure would likely follow.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has taken significant steps in recent years to increase the procedural safeguards
available in criminal cases. Because defendants are not guaranteed
an appeal as a matter of right, however, a very significant number
of criminal convictions are not subjected to significant scrutiny.
Broad review on habeas is therefore essential.
The Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act was intended to provide for a comprehensive state writ, discarding rigid concepts of
forfeiture and default. This enlarged scope is consistent with the
full review of alleged constitutional violations called for in the act.
Moreover, it reflects a general trend toward subjecting state criminal process to more rigorous constitutional scrutiny.
The recent limitation of the scope of federal habeas corpus
properly calls for an expansion rather than a contraction of state
constitutional review. State judges should now be willing to shoulder the difficult burden of constitutional analysis more eagerly, as
they are entrusted with a larger share of the responsibility for the
protection of the rights of criminal defendants.' Rather than dependence upon federal adjudication of civil liberties, criminal defendants must increasingly turn to "the independent protective
force of state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties
cannot be guaranteed."'"
0 See Cox, Federalismand Individual Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw.
U. L. Rav. 1, 12 (1978).
" Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
H~Av. L. Rav. 489, 491 (1977).
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